The paper examines short-run exchange rate dynamics in an emerging market based on the recent microstructure framework of foreign exchange markets where the main explanatory variable is the order flow of end-user customers. The study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it modifies the model to take account of a unique feature of the majority of emerging markets, namely the existence of a black market for FOREX. Secondly, it uses a unique database covering almost the complete Ghanaian market, and for a long time span compared to previous studies, which typically use data for a single market-maker and for a short period of time. The study confirms the contemporaneous relationship between flows and exchange rates suggested by the previous literature (Evans and Lyons, 2002a) but it also finds a lagged interaction between order flow and exchange rates, which could be due to the delays in the price transmission, which are associated with market inefficiencies. Order flow impacts on exchange rates through the official market, while its impact on the black market is only temporary. Additionally, the study confirms the connection between the price impact of the order flow and the degree of liquidity in the FX market.
1.

Introduction
This study tries to explain the behaviour of the exchange rate in an emerging market, namely Ghana, based on the recent microstructure framework of foreign exchange markets. This is one of the very few studies to apply such a framework to an emerging market. 1 One key premise of the microstructure approach is the explanatory role of the order flow in the behaviour of the exchange rate. The study uses a unique database, which covers over 80% of the customer order flow of the Ghanaian FX market.
2 This is in contrast to previous studies, such as Evans and Lyons (2002a) , and Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) that use data for a single market-maker and often for a short period of time. In addition, the longer time span also allows for a more precise estimation of the impact of order flow on weekly exchange rate movements.
Furthermore, the study takes into account a unique feature of the majority of emerging markets, namely the existence of a black market for foreign exchange. Thus, we consider the interaction of the black market and order flow, and black market and official market, in addition to the interaction between the official rate and order flow.
The black market is thus an additional channel for disseminating public and/or private information.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 provides the main characteristics of the Ghanaian FX market and their impact on the role of order flow as a transmission mechanism for private information. Section 4 presents the data and methodology. Section 5 reports the empirical evidence, while Section 6 summarises and concludes the paper.
Review of the literature
Foreign exchange microstructure research has been motivated by the need to understand exchange rate dynamics at short horizons. 3 The dominant exchange rate models of the recent decades take a macro perspective and come from the macro modelling tradition and have some relative value at long horizons. The search to find a new framework to explain short-run exchange rate dynamics has led to the micro-structural approach to exchange rates, which takes into account the currency trading process. These microbased models set out to model the structure of the foreign exchange market in a more 1 The only two other studies on emerging markets are Wu (2006) for Brazil and Gereben, et al. (2006) for Hungary. 2 The data were provided through contacts at the Central Bank of Ghana. 3 For a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature see Osler (2009) .
realistic manner. In this setting, information is dispersed and heterogeneous agents have different information sets. The trading process itself is not transparent and agents may have access to private information about fundamentals or non-fundamental variables that can be exploited in the short-run. Consequently the transactions of betterinformed agents may have a larger effect on exchange rates than those of uninformed agents. Thus, the microstructure approach not only recognises private information as being important for exchange rate determination but also takes into account how differences between agents and trading mechanisms affect exchange rates. (see Evans and Lyons, 2002a) . This is in contrast to macro models, which assume that all relevant information is commonly known and all participants are the same. 4 Thus, one of the most important explanatory variables in the microstructure approach to exchange rates is order flow. Order flow, as defined by Evans and Lyons (2002a) refers to "net of buyer-initiated and seller initiated orders; it is a measure of net buying pressure." Order flow consists of 'signed' transaction volumes. When a participant initiates a transaction by selling the base currency in exchange for foreign currency, the order has a negative sign. On the contrary, if participants buy foreign currency in exchange for base currency, the order has a positive sign.
By observing order flow, a participant might be able to have an idea of the sort of information others may hold. For example, if an initiator's expectation is that the base currency will fall, this may lead to a sale of the base currency in exchange for the foreign currency. This order flow will, thus, provide vital information to other participants and might result in the strengthening of the foreign currency. Order flow is viewed as a transmission mechanism through which information is transmitted to price.
The extent to which order flow is informative depends on the factors that cause it. It is most informative when it transmits private information about macroeconomic fundamentals that is scattered among agents. By aggregating information in this way, order flow establishes a connection between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rate movements. On the other hand, order flow is less informative when it is as a result of inventory control activities in reaction to liquidity shocks. Nevertheless, the importance of order flow in exchange rate determination does not mean that it is the underlying cause of exchange rate movements. Rather it is a proximate cause with information being the underlying cause. The problem then lies in identifying what information determines order flow.
The relatively impressive explanatory power of order flow has been confirmed by several microstructure studies. For example, Evans and Lyons (2002a) This contemporaneous relationship between order flow and the exchange rate has been confirmed in other studies and for different currency order flow combinations.
For example, for the deutschmark see Lyons (2001), Payne (2003) ; for the Euro see Breedon and Vitale (2004) and Berger et al. (2006) , for the Japanese Yen see Evans and Lyons (2002a) ; for the British sterling see Berger et al. (2006) ; and for several other
European currencies see Evans and Lyons (2002b) and Rime (2001) . Another group of studies examine the information content of disaggregated order flow. 6 They find that financial customer order flow is positively correlated with exchange rate movements, whilst non-financial customer order flow is negatively correlated. They interpret these results that financial customer flows contain price relevant information with nonfinancial customers following negative feedback trading rules. 5 We should expect a positively signed interest differential where the interest rate differential is the nondollar interest rate minus the US interest rate. 6 See e.g. Carpenter and Wang (2004) , Froot and Ramadorai (2005) , Evans and Lyons (2005) , Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) .
Because of the strict causality running from order flow to price, the above empirical models do not allow for the case where exchange rate movements could cause order flow (feedback effects). In the presence of feedback effects, the coefficient estimate of order flow is biased and the results from the model could be misleading.
The possibility of feedback trading rules was taken into account in Payne (2003) by applying a simple VAR methodology introduced in Hasbrouck (1991) . This linear VAR model consists of trades and quote revisions. The dataset covers all interdealer trades transacted through the Reuters Dealing 2000-2 system in the spot USD/DEM market over the week spanning October 6 th to October 10 th 1997. The results show that order flow is a fundamental determinant of exchange rate movements even if one takes into account feedback trading. Danielsson and Love (2004) also examine the issue of feedback trading, but their paper looks at contemporaneous feedback trading and its effect on the informativeness of order flow. Thus, the VAR specification differs from that of Payne 2003 in that order flow is allowed to depend on current exchange rate returns. Using brokered interdealer data for the spot USD/EUR, they find that when contemporaneous feedback trading is allowed, the impact of order flow shock is larger compared to the previous case.
The key question addressed in this paper is: Do the main results from the microstructure approach to modelling advanced FX markets also hold for emerging FX markets? There are only a couple of studies which have examined the role of order flow in emerging FX markets. One of those is Wu (2006) In our study we start with the basic model of Evans and Lyons (2002a) and modify it to take account on the one hand, of market inefficiencies and on the other hand, of the existence of black market. The black market for FOREX is a widespread phenomenon in emerging markets. The paper using proprietary data covering almost the whole market confirms the importance of order flow in explaining short-run exchange rate dynamics. The study confirms the contemporaneous relationship (between order flows and exchange rates as suggested by previous studies. However, we also observe a lagged interaction between order flow and exchange rates. These lagged effects could be due to the delays in the price transmission which are associated with inefficiencies related to the aggregation of private information due to the characteristics of the Ghanaian FX market. Order flow impacts on exchange rates through the official market, while its impact on the black market is only temporary.
Additionally, the study confirms the connection between the price impact of the order flow and the degree liquidity in the FX market.
Main Characteristics of the Ghanaian FX market
Between January to August 2007, average daily market turnover in the Ghanaian FX market was approximately $38m. It is a spot market with no forward FX market. The central bank is the main supplier of FX with its main source being export receipts, donor inflows, taxes and royalties. Unlike the major currencies (with liquid markets) that are traded worldwide, a small currency like the Cedi, the Ghanaian currency, is only traded onshore in Ghana. 7 The US dollar is the most traded foreign currency in Ghana and subsequently plays the role of a vehicle currency in cross currency transactions.
The black market for foreign exchange in Ghana came to existence for a number of reasons. In early 1980s the black market was thriving due to smuggling and illegal FX operations. 8 In 1981 the FX operations had become so widespread that the black market rate was 9.6 times higher than the official rate. Around this period, transactions in the black economy accounted for about a third of Ghana's GDP.
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In 1986, however, the government introduced a system where the exchange rate was determined by periodic currency auctions, which were under the influence of market forces and consisted of a two-tier exchange rate system, one rate for essentials and another for nonessentials. By 1987, the two auctions were merged. Most of the foreign exchange inflows were allocated through the auctions. In an attempt to eradicate black market operations, the government allowed private foreign-exchange bureaus (thereafter FX bureaus) to trade in foreign currency. In July 1989, there were 148 FX bureaus operating all over Ghana. Eventually the huge gap between the auction rate and FX bureau rate narrowed drastically. Specifically, the gap narrowed from 29% in 1988 to about 6% in 1991. In 1992, the auction system was abandoned. FX bureaus and other purchasers of foreign currency were referred to the central bank, which used the market-determined exchange rate. Gradually Ghana moved towards a marketdetermined exchange rate and lowered tariffs in order to attract more trade. In this study we use the FX bureaus rate as a proxy for the black market rate.
Only licensed banks and foreign exchange bureaus are allowed to perform FX intermediation. In Ghana, all the banks (both domestic and foreign-owned) are permitted to deal in FX. The licensing of intermediaries makes it easier for the central bank to enforce its regulations concerning the use and exchange of foreign currency.
For example, a customer will have to provide the proper documentation relating to the 7 Central bank regulations prohibit the operation of offshore trading of the Cedi. 8 Black markets come into existence, when access to the official foreign exchange market is limited and there are various foreign exchange restrictions on international transactions of goods, services and assets. An excess demand develops for foreign currency at the official rate, which encourages some of the supply of foreign currency to be sold illegally, at a market price higher than the official rate." (see Phylaktis 1997) . 9 It should be noted that often a substantial black economy feeds the black foreign exchange market.
underlying economic transaction that is generating the demand for foreign currency. It is regulations like these that make the parallel market a suitable alternative. Consequently the bureaus in Ghana search for scarce FX on the market to pay the recipients. This is contrary to the normal procedure where it is rather the cedi-equivalent of the remittance that is paid to recipients. Aside from the banks, the FX bureaus and the financial services companies for remittances constituting the forex market, there is the usual unofficial parallel forex market made up of illegal forex dealers who operate from unauthorized locations. According to the central bank, their operations constitute less than 5 percent of the forex market turnover.
Thus, certain characteristics of the microstructure of the Ghanaian foreign exchange market will have an impact on the role of order flow as a transmission mechanism for private information. The low level of interdealer market and the lack of electronic trading platforms might slow down the aggregation of private information.
On the other hand, the few players in the market might increase the aggregation process because there is greater transparency as each player observes a greater proportion of the market. Furthermore, the great involvement of the Central Bank in the foreign exchange market limits the scope for price discovery. Finally, the existence of FX bureaus might contribute to the aggregation of private information as another market player closely in touch with customers.
At the same time, the Central Bank in setting the exchange rate each day could be observing the FX bureau rate as it is freely determined and changed three four times a day. Thus, there is simultaneously another dynamic relationship between the official rate and the FX bureau rate, which is linking the two rates together in the long-run and which has to be taken into account in modelling the relationship between order flow and the exchange rate.
In the next section, we present the data employed and the models we estimate.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Data
The Central Bank of Ghana is the main source of data for the spot foreign exchange market. The data set includes both the daily official and the FX Bureau rate, which is a and ask quotes at the close of each day. The transaction rate charged by a particular bank will depend on the availability of FX at that point in time.
For an emerging market like Ghana, it would be unwise to disregard the thriving black market for exchange rates. The Ghanaian Central bank acknowledges this fact and therefore incorporates black market exchange rates (FX Bureau rates) in its analysis and decision making. The official (transaction rate) is a weighted average of the rates charged of the various bank transaction rates, with the volumes used as weights, and the FX Bureau rate.
The interest rate differential is the difference between the Ghana daily threemonth Treasury bill rate and the US daily three-month Treasury bill rate, expressed on an annual basis. The Ghanaian rates were collected from the Central Bank of Ghana while the US data were obtained from the Federal Reserve website.
The data sample is diverse in the sense that it contains a period of relative stability and a period of turbulence (see Figure 1a) . Therefore, the sample period is divided into two sub-periods. The first sub-period represents the crisis period spanning the whole of 2000(see Figure 1b) . The crisis period was characterised by spiralling inflation of more than 40% and rapid deprecation of the cedi. During 2000, the cedi depreciated by about 50% against the US dollar. This situation could be attributed to falling prices of Ghana's major exports commodities (main foreign exchange earners), namely cocoa, gold and timber. To further exacerbate this situation, the price of ). 13 The black market premium is defined as the spread between the black market rate and the official rate divided by the official rate and multiplied by 100. Data analysis will show that the exchange rate behaves differently during these two sub-periods.
Although the original data is at a daily frequency, preliminary regressions indicated that daily data is noisy. Consequently, we aggregate the data to a weekly frequency in an attempt to solve the problem.
We explore the long-run relationship between the official and black exchange rates, by testing whether the black market premium is stationary using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favour of the stationarity alternative for both periods. 15 This is an indication that the black market premium is stationary for both periods. In other words, the official and black rates move in tandem in the long-run.
The descriptive statistics (see Tables 1-3) indicate that the exchange rates as expected are very volatile during the crisis period, but are relatively stable during the stable period. The standard deviations are abnormally high during the crisis period, compared to that of the stable period. In order to give an idea of scale, we compare these movements to that of a larger and more liquid market like the euro-dollar.
Specifically we compare the movements of the CEDI/USD to the EUR/USD over the crisis and stable period. In comparison to the CEDI/USD movements, the EUR/USD has enjoyed extreme stability. The relative stability experienced by the Ghanaian CEDI would be equivalent to a currency crisis for the Euro.
14 It should be noted that the transitional period between the crisis period and the relatively stable period, Jan 2001 to Jan 2002, was left out. Data during that period was noisy and could over-shadow the actual results of the analysis. 15 Results not shown but can be provided by the authors. Similar results were found in Phylaktis and Moore (2000) for other Emerging Markets.
With the exception of black market rate changes during the crisis period, exchange rate changes are generally serially correlated. All the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelation coefficients are statistically significant (see Tables 4-7 ). This could be evidence of huge inefficiencies in an under-developed and illiquid market. This issue will be addressed when considering our modelling strategy.
Order Flow Data
Most banks consider their customer trades to be highly confidential and are usually reluctant to release such data to the public. In Ghana, it is a regulatory requirement for all market making banks (both Ghanaian and foreign) to report all their daily foreign exchange transactions to the central bank. These commercial banks register every 16 See Price Water House and Coopers (2006) . SCB and BBG were the first banks to be set up in Ghana at the beginning of the 20th century. Their main line of business was trade finance and they mainly served the expatriate community. This trend has continued with a majority of their customers being multinationals and large and medium-scaled enterprises. GCB was the first indigenous bank to be set up in 1953. Its main objective was to extend credit to the local population. GCB owns about 50% of all branches in Ghana. Its customer base is well diversified with customers ranging from state enterprises to private individuals. It is the largest bank in Ghana in terms of deposits and assets. ADB was a development bank established in 1965 to cater for the needs of the agricultural sector. It has a vital role since the agricultural sector is still the largest contributor to the GDP. Until 2005 it was the sole agent for Western Union money transfer. As a result remittances account for about 90% of its foreign flows. Customer base consists of mainly small to medium scaled enterprises and private individuals. SSB is the smallest bank in the 1 st quartile. It was set up by the social security and national insurance trust in 1977. Societe Generale, the French Bank, acquired controlling interest in the bank in March 2003.
This data set provides us with a relatively complete picture of the cedi/dollar market. This is similar to the datasets of Rime (2003) and Bjønnes, Rime and Solheim Unfortunately, this data set does not allow us to distinguish between the various customer groups as has been possible in some earlier studies (see Marsh and O'Rourke, 2005 , Bjønnes, Solheim, 2005 and Menkhoff, 2003) . Generally, the big commercial banks experience large customer order flows due to the nature of their customer base. Nevertheless, this dataset is unique in so many ways. As mentioned above it is one of few studies, which is based on a complete data set. 17 Thus, it gives a more complete picture of the FX market than studies such as Evans and Lyons (2002a) , Froot and Ramadorai (2005) , Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) who use data for a single market-maker and for a short period of time. Furthermore, the longer time span also allows for a more precise estimation of the impact of order flow on exchange rate movements.
Methodology
We start our analysis with the static framework proposed by Evans and Lyons (2002a) to be consistent with previous literature. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this static model will be successful at capturing the dynamics of a largely inefficient, underdeveloped and illiquid FX market. Furthermore, it ignores the relationship between official and black markets. We subsequently explain the modifications to the model to 17 It should be noted that the data covers only domestic commercial banks, as financial institutions registered outside Ghana do not have reporting obligations to the Central Bank of Ghana. take into account the characteristics of foreign exchange markets in Emerging economies.
The generic order flow model proposed by the Evans and Lyons (2002a) β , the coefficient of order flow, is positive and significant we say that the purchase of dollars by customers results in a depreciation of the cedi (an increase in the exchange rate versus the dollar). This refers to the null hypothesis of the order flow concept. The null hypothesis states that information from order flow causes exchange rate changes.
We modify the generic model in the following ways. First, as indicated by the presence of autocorrelation in exchange rates, there are inefficiencies in the Ghanaian foreign exchange markets (see Tables 4-7) . We capture the dynamics in the market by including lags of both the explanatory and dependent variables. We are thus taking into account the fact that changes in order flow and interest rate differential may not affect the exchange rate immediately but rather with a lag over several time periods. When customer trades are executed, there may be some delay in the time it takes for the information conveyed by trades to be embedded in exchange rate. As explained in section 3, features of the Ghanaian foreign exchange market might affect the aggregation of information and the impact of order flow on exchange rates. Second, we include the black market premium to take into account the long-run relationship between the black and official exchange rates.
Third, we explore whether the explanatory power of order flow comes from its expected, unexpected component or both. In the Evans and Lyons (2002a) model, all order flow is deemed to be unexpected (and statistically this assumption appears to be borne out by the unpredictability of most major market order flow series at daily horizons). However, in the case of Ghana we will demonstrate that order flow is to some extent predictable and it is possible that explanatory power comes from both the expected and unexpected components. In this case, whilst unexpected order flow measures price discovery in the FX market, expected flow would be an indication of inefficiencies in the FX market.
Our modified model is based on an enriched version of the VAR in Love and
Payne (2008) . We say 'enriched' in the sense that, though we drop the news variable from their equation, we include lagged changes in the black and official market rates, lagged changes in the interest differential and lagged black market premium. We decompose order flow into expected (EF) and unexpected (UF) components and determine which component accounts for movements in the official and black exchange rates.
The equation for the official exchange rate is given below: 
where is the log change in official exchange rate, is the net order flow,
Δ is the log change in the black market rate, t r Δ is the change in the interest differential and is the black market premium. We estimate equations for the exchange rate and the order flow individually using OLS. 
We store the fitted values as expected flows and the residuals as unexpected flows. We then substitute the expected and unexpected flow variables in the exchange rate equation and run the regression. This is done for both the official and black market exchange rates. Specifically one equation has changes in the official exchange rate as the dependent variable, whilst the other has changes in the black market rate as the dependent variable.
Since these equations have many regressors we adopt the general to specific modelling approach. Specifically we start with an extremely general model, which is over-parameterised, then we reduce it to the most parsimonious model by testing various coefficient restrictions. We start with a maximum lag length of 4. Schwarz's (1978) Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) is used to determine the appropriate lag length for the variables in this dynamic equation. We choose the lag length which minimises the SBIC. We also apply the Newey-West procedure which results in standard errors that are consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. It should be noted that we estimate the regressions for the two sub-periods separately. For the crisis period, the order flow variable is positively signed and significant in explaining movements in the official exchange rate (see Table 8 ). This means that a net purchase of dollars by customers is associated with a depreciation of the cedi. The interest differential is also positively signed and significant as expected. When the dependent variable is the change in the black market rate, order flow is not significant.
Empirical Evidence
Main Results
In other words, flows have no explanatory power in the black market during the crisis period. The interest differential is however highly significant and correctly signed in both markets.
During the stable period, order flow is highly significant but negatively signed with the official exchange rate as the dependent variable. For the black market rate order flow is only significant at 10% significance level but is still negatively signed.
The interest differential is insignificant.
In general, the results of the static model are unconvincing. Given the peculiarities of the Ghanaian FX market we proceed to estimate the modified model as represented by equations (2) and (3). Detailed results for the order flow are presented in Table 9 , while for the exchange rate are presented in Table 10 . Looking first at the results for order flow we observe positive momentum during the stable period and negative momentum during the crisis period. 18 The interest rate differential is only statistically significant during the crisis period. The adjusted R 2 during the stable In general both expected and unexpected components (current and/or lagged) of order flow are significant in explaining movements in exchange rates. Specifically, during the crisis period expected and unexpected flows have an instantaneous and lagged effect on the official exchange rate. However, they both have only lagged effects on the black market exchange rate. Another important observation is that the lagged black market premium is statistically significant in the black market exchange rate. It is negative. This negative correlation implies that an increase in the (black market) premium is associated with an appreciation of the black market rate. Thus, in the long-run, the black market rate eventually adjusts to the official rate. The interest rate differential is positive as expected and statistically significant only in the official market indicating that different factors might affect the black market rate. The adjusted R 2 varies from 0.240 to 0.697 and is higher in the official market.
A clearer picture emerges about the impact of order flow on the exchange rate when we add up the coefficients of the lags of the order flow components in the specific model (see Table 11 ). For example, an unexpected net customer purchase of $1bn over the previous four weeks during the crisis period will result in 37% depreciation of today's exchange rate.
In the official market, unexpected order flow has a larger impact on exchange rates relative to expected order flow and is correctly (positively) signed for both crisis and stable periods. Results for the black market are mixed. Unexpected order flow has a relatively smaller impact for both periods but is negatively signed during the stable 18 One would have expected the otherway round as the black market rate is more flexible than the official rate. It might be that in the case of Ghana the reforms of the FX market have eroded the importance of the black market to such an extent that it can be disregarded for most of the major results in this paper. 19 In addition to the decomposition used in the paper, we also decompose flows based on fundamentals. Our results carry through.
period. We also observe that the coefficients during the crisis are generally much larger in magnitude compared to those in the stable period. In other words the dollar impact of flows on exchange rates is much larger in the crisis period. This is consistent with findings by Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) . They find that there is a connection between the magnitude of coefficients and the liquidity of the FX market. Specifically in very liquid markets (like the euro-dollar and dollar yen) coefficients are relatively small in comparison to the larger coefficients in the smaller, less liquid markets (like the euroyen and pound-yen). Similarly in our case the magnitude of the coefficients are much larger during the crisis period when the cedi-dollar market is almost illiquid compared to the coefficients in the stable period when the market is relatively liquid. In other words, the magnitude of the impact of order flows on exchange rates depends on the level of liquidity in the Ghanaian FX market.
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In most cases other variables like the lagged changes in exchanges rates (official and black) are very significant. As discussed previously this is consistent with the inefficiencies and under-development in the Ghanaian FX market. As a result agents' speculation about future exchange rate movements is based on immediate past values of the exchange rate itself. Subsequently an initial depreciation induces a series of buying which causes a further depreciation of the domestic currency.
Temporary or Permanent effects of order Flow?
It is critical to order flow literature to ascertain whether impacts are temporary or permanent. If the effects of unexpected flows are permanent then that means information is being conveyed by flows. On the other hand, the temporary effect of unexpected flows could be as a result of a variety of liquidity effects. To find out whether effects of flows are temporary or permanent, we test for the significance of aggregated effect. We conduct a Wald coefficient restriction test on the flow variables.
This consists of an F-test with a null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is zero.
In other words the null hypothesis states that the aggregate effect of flows is temporary.
A rejection of the null in favour of the alternative could mean that the aggregate effects of flows are permanent and vice versa. The Wald tests were conducted on the specific models, i.e. when the insignificant coefficients have been eliminated.
Unexpected order flow has a permanent effect for both periods only in the official market. This could be interpreted to mean that unexpected order flow conveys incremental information which causes changes in the exchange rate (see Table 12 ).
20 Supporting evidence of the reduced liquidity during the crisis period is provided by the much higher bid/ask spread for both the official and black markets. The spread in the official (black) market was 0.250 (0.418) during the crisis period, compared to 0.120 (0.237) during the stable period.
Interpretation of Results
During the crisis period, unexpected order flow has a larger permanent effect on official and is positively (correctly) signed. Though unexpected order flow is positively signed in the black market, its aggregate effect is only temporary. According to literature this is what we should expect. During this turbulent period, falling cocoa and gold prices coupled with rising oil prices and donor inflows being withheld led to expectations of poor future fundamentals. This induced an excess demand for FX and economic agents, who were in a state of panic and were willing to pay high premiums for an already scarce commodity. This continuous bidding-up of FX at high premiums led to a spiralling of the exchange rate and contributed to the 50% depreciation.
During the stable period both expected and unexpected flows have a permanent impact on the official exchange rate. Again, unexpected order flow has a relatively larger impact and is positively signed. Nevertheless, the price-impact of unexpected order flow is much lower during the stable period. As previously discussed, this could be related to the level of liquidity during both periods. Interestingly, even though expected order flow has a smaller impact, its effect is permanent and is negatively signed. During this calm period, a significant portion of the FX transactions are carried out by corporates (mostly multinationals) who are often assumed to follow negative feedback trading rules. In other words, corporates buy the currency that has just depreciated. According to existing literature corporates usually take advantage of these short-term exchange rate movements to exchange money for non-speculative reasons like repatriation of funds and import of raw materials. The presence of negative feedback trading is confirmed by the highly significant and negatively signed lagged exchange rate variables in the order flow VAR (see Table 10 ). Thus negative feedback trading of corporates is over-shadowed by the price discovery/information aggregation process.
On the black market, Expected and unexpected order flow have only temporary effects and are both negatively signed. The absence of price discovery reflects the nature of transactions on the black market. The official FX market is relatively stable and it costs less (and is more convenient) for customers (individuals and institutions) to obtain FX from the banks. As a result a majority of the flows are seen by commercial banks. By observing the coefficients we see that the price-impact is relatively small in comparison to the other flows. This is because there are many small players on the black market who observe significantly smaller flows in comparison to the banks.
These results further confirm previous findings that it is rather the black market rate that adjusts to the official spot rate.
Modelling the long-run relationship between exchange rate and order flows
Previous tests we conducted have been aimed at capturing the short-term dynamics in the Ghanaian FX market. Next, we attempt to investigate the long-run relationship between the levels of exchange rate and the cumulative customer order flow. Since the black market rate is rather adjusting to the official rate, we include only the level of the official rate and cumulated order flow in our cointegration analysis.
Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Table 13) , we confirm that the two series are non-stationary. Thus, the null hypothesis is the level of official exchange rate and cumulative customer order flow are not cointegrated, against an alternative of one cointegrating vector. We determine the lag length of 4 for the VAR using Schwarz
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). According to the Johansen procedure, the null of no cointegration is rejected at 5 percent level and further suggests that there is only one cointegrating vector (Table 14) . We estimate the vector error-correction model.
The coefficients of the cointegrating relationship are significant and correctly signed (Table 15) . Results from the short-run dynamics are reinforced as the cumulative customer order flow is positively correlated with the levels of official exchange rate. In order to have an idea of which variables provide adjustment to equilibrium, we examine the error correction coefficients, which are highly significant in both the order flow and exchange rate equations (Table 15 ). This means that tests for weak exogeneity have been strongly rejected for both variables. The load of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium falls solely the official exchange rate. The negative (wrong) sign of the error correction in the flows equation indicates that flows do not adjust to cause equilibrium but rather move in the opposite direction. However the relatively higher speed of adjustment of flows means that eventually flows should 'catch up' with the official exchange rate in order for the whole system to attain the equilibrium. Clearly these cointegration results could be described as weak because the adjustment process is ambiguous.
Discussion and Conclusion
In Ghana, customer order flow greatly influences exchange rates, reinforcing the importance of order flow stated in previous literature. In considering an emerging market like Ghana, we need to consider some distinct features of the economy. The economic fundamentals governing the Ghanaian cedi are mainly dependent on external factors, mainly world commodity prices and foreign capital flows. For several years the Ghanaian cedi has remained vulnerable. Therefore, it could be argued that the trades of customers of the top foreign banks, who control about 80% of the FX market, may convey more superior private information about future fundamentals than their local counterparts. At the same time however, we can not ignore the existence of the black market for foreign exchange.
We test our data using the Evans and Lyons (2002a) model and find that it does not work. We modify itto take into account the market inefficiencies, poor infrastructure and lack of advanced technology in the Ghanaian FX markets which create delays in the price transmission mechanism. We attempt to capture these delays and other inefficiencies by introducing a dynamic model. Additionally, we take into account the long-run relationship between the black and official rates. Furthermore, we investigate whether the expected or unexpected component of order flow is responsible for movements in the exchange rates. Evidence of a permanent effect of unexpected flows would mean that they convey private information and as a result there is price discovery. Significant impact of expected order flow on the exchange rate would represent inefficiencies in the FX market.
Our results indicate that unexpected order flow has a permanent effect only in the official market during both periods. This is consistent with previous literature that unexpected flows convey incremental private information that affects exchange rates.
In other words, it is the shock component of flow that matters. We find that unexpected order flow is highly significant and positively correlated with changes in the official.
The only exception is the black market during the stable period where unexpected order flow is negatively correlated with exchange rates. In the official market, unexpected order flow has a relatively larger impact on the exchange rate changes than expected order flow for both crisis and stable period. The smaller impact of unexpected order flow on the black rate might be due to the fact that there are numerous smaller players in the black market. The lack of price discovery in the black market could be due to the fact that a majority of the FX transactions (by corporates and individuals) occur in the official market. On the other hand transactions on the black market are significantly lower in terms of volume and value. Not surprisingly most of these transactions are conducted by individuals and petty traders. During the 3 rd quarter of 2007, total purchases by banks was $1.1bn compared to $96m for forex bureaus whilst total sales by banks was $882m compared to $95m for forex bureaus. We also observe that the lagged black market premium (which is highly significant) is negatively correlated with changes in the black market rate. This suggests that it is rather the black market rate that adjusts to the official rate to cause a return to equilibrium.
Cointegration tests reveal that there is a long-run relationship between levels of official rates and cumulative order flow. Consistent with market microstructure theory, cumulative order flow is positively correlated with the official exchange rate.
Furthermore the official rate is largely responsible for the adjustment to equilibrium.
Our results give us a deeper insight into the relationship between order flow and the exchange rates for different regimes in emerging markets. Specifically, there is strong evidence of information aggregation and price discovery for the official market during both regimes, similar to findings of Evans and Lyons (2002a) . However for the official FX market during the stable period, order flow is as a result of negative feedback trading by corporates similar to findings by Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) .
Unexpected order flow is correctly signed and has a larger impact on exchange rate as theory suggests. Nonetheless, expected order flow too seems to have an impact on order flow and this is due to inefficiencies in the FX market. There is evidence of both price discovery and negative feedback trading but the former overshadows the latter.
Not only do we confirm the contemporaneous relationship (between flows and exchange rate) suggested by previous literature (Evans and Lyons (2002a) but we also observe a lagged interaction between order flow and exchange rates. These lagged effects are due to the delays in the price transmission which are associated with inefficiencies in the FX market. Additionally we observe that when the market is almost illiquid during crisis, order flow has a relatively larger impact on exchange rates than in the stable period when the market is more liquid. This confirms findings by Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) who find that there is a connection between the price impact of the order flow and the degree liquidity in the FX market. T-values are in parentheses. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction. All equations are estimated using basic OLS. We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 10. T-values are in parentheses. Standard error estimates are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West HAC correction. All equations are estimated using basic OLS. We scale the order flow coefficients by multiplying by 10. 
